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James Buchanan and Ideals of Manhood in the Election of 1856 
 
“No other man but Mr. Buchanan could have been elected with the opposition we have 
encountered at the North.  He was the most suitable man for the times.” 
 
 
Introduction 
In 1995, Gail Bederman published her groundbreaking monograph Manliness and 
Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917.  In 
this study she defined manhood not as “an unchanging essence inherent in all male-
bodied humans” but as a “historical, ideological process” that is constantly being made 
and remade.1 Manliness and Civilization investigated this historical process, specifically 
how late 19th and early 20th century Americans succeeded in redefining ideal manhood.  
In one case study, Bederman charted a process of American society moving from an ideal 
of manhood defined by self-restraint to one more in line with the active rough and tumble 
behavior epitomized by President Theodore Roosevelt.2  Bederman charted how a young 
Roosevelt “masculinized his image” and transformed himself from an eastern elitist “Jane 
Dandy” to the “cowboy of the Dakotas.”3  Not only did TR remake his own image to fit 
this ideal of manhood, but he also encouraged other men to remake their manhood as 
well, concerned that their “fighting virtues” could be diminished by too much self-
                                                 
1 Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 6. 
2 Bederman, Manliness, 170-215. 
3 Bederman, Manliness, 171. 
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restraint.4  Bederman argued that Roosevelt “urged the men of the American race to live 
the sort of life he had modeled for them: to be virile, vigorous, and manly, and to reject 
the over-civilized decadence by supporting a strenuously imperialistic foreign policy.”5  
According to Bederman, it was not just personality traits that marked someone as 
upholding ideal manhood, but the policy positions they adopted as well. 
Writing in 2008, historian Kevin Murphy built upon Bederman’s claims. In his 
book, Political Manhood, Murphy agreed that “by the turn of the twentieth-century, a 
red-blooded Rooseveltian model of masculinity proved ascendant and functioned as a 
prescriptive ideal for American men.”6 Further, Murphy argued that there were 
“competing ideologies of manhood” during the Progressive Era and that “the strenuous 
model [of manhood] was deployed in order to marginalize the careers and projects of 
political actors successfully stigmatized as weak and effeminate.”7 Not only was a new 
ideal of manhood being upheld, but it was being weaponized as well. There was a 
political cost to those who found themselves on the wrong side of the new ascendant 
ideal of manhood.  
Crucial to Murphy’s study was the cultural construction of the homosexual 
identity during the Progressive Era.8 He maintained that the political actors of his study 
were able to be successfully stigmatized “through a powerful correlation of weakness and 
effeminacy with homosexuality at the turn of the century.”9 
                                                 
4 Bederman, Manliness, 185. 
5 Bederman, Manliness, 188. 
6 Kevin Murphy, Political Manhood: Red Bloods, Mollycoddles, and the Politics of Progressive Era 
Reform. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 38. 
7 Murphy, Manhood, 40. 
8 Also see George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male 
World, 1890-1940. (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
9 Murphy, Manhood, 41. 
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 This study seeks to build upon the work of these scholars. If Bederman and 
Murphy’s “continual, dynamic process” of defining manhood operated during the 
Progressive Era, this process should be observable during the Antebellum Era as well, 
before Theodore Roosevelt’s strenuous life became ascendant and before a homosexual 
identity came into being.10  Further, as Murphy found during the Progressive Era, there is 
evidence that competing ideals of manhood were weaponized for political gain in the 
Antebellum Era as well. Before there was a homosexual label to threaten political actors 
with, how were ideals of manhood weaponized? Were these tactics successful? 
 Where Bederman used President Theodore Roosevelt (among others) as case 
studies, this paper will examine the competition between different ideals of manhood 
through the lens of the American presidential election of 1856, when the bachelor 
candidate James Buchanan defeated John Fremont at the polls. What role, if any, did 
Buchanan’s bachelorhood play in the campaign? What can it tell us about ideals of 
manhood at the time? 
 A presidential election is a useful lens with which to uncover contemporary ideals 
of manhood. Inherently competitive, these contests provide numerous primary resources 
with which to evaluate how different campaigns navigated and weaponized ideals of 
manhood, as well as providing a clear winner among competing ideals. Presidential 
historian Jackson Katz wrote as much in his 2013 study Leading Men: Presidential 
Campaigns and the Politics of Manhood.  According to Katz, “Presidential campaigns 
function as symbolic contests over competing definitions of ‘real manhood,’ and thus 
over what kind of man can, and should be, in charge.”11 Like Bederman, he also believed 
                                                 
10 Bederman, Manliness, 6. 
11 Jackson Katz, Leading Men: Presidential Campaigns and the Politics of Manhood. (Northampton: 
Interlink Publishing, 2013), 28. 
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that “this does not mean that image is everything and issues don’t matter. Voters make 
judgments about a candidate’s manhood based on both his personal attributes and his 
positions on certain key issues.”12  Bederman saw imperialism as the political issue 
around which manhood was debated during the Progressive Era; in the Antebellum Era 
the key issue was the future of slavery. 
Historian Michael D. Pierson examined the intersection of gender and politics 
during the Antebellum Era in his 2003 study entitled Free Hearts and Free Homes: 
Gender and American Antislavery Politics.  Pierson’s monograph investigated the role 
gender ideals played within the Republican Party and its precursors going back to the 
1830s.  While being careful to note that disparate ideals of gender did not cause the Civil 
War, Pierson maintained that they certainly contributed to its outbreak.  In his 
introduction Pierson argued that:  
To be sure, political parties and voters cared about many issues; gender 
concerns were only a part of what made a person join one of the parties.  
But parties did consistently try to exploit the gender beliefs of their 
constituents as they carefully crafted campaign biographies, newspaper 
editorials, and the gendered division of labor at rallies to appeal to 
voters…Such dramatic social and rhetorical divisions on personal issues 
like gender roles and family structures helped to produce the image that 
two very different societies were in competition with each other.  Driven 
apart by a host of legislative issues, the anti-slavery parties and the South 
were further separated by their gender politics.  With moral and personal 
issues very much on the line, civil war was that much more imaginable for 
American voters and their families.13 
 
Similarly, ideals of manhood were not the defining aspect of the election of 1856 but, as 
will be seen, they definitely played a significant role during the campaign. Pierson’s 
chapter on the election of 1856 is especially relevant to this paper.  His investigation of 
                                                 
12 Katz, Leading Men, 28. 
13 Michael D. Pierson. Free Hearts and Free Homes: Gender and American Antislavery Politics. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 40-41. 
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the campaign literature showed that the nascent Republican Party certainly saw 
Buchanan’s distance from particular ideals of manhood as an exploitable issue that might 
make Fremont appear more attractive to voters by comparison.  The focus of Pierson’s 
monograph was on the antislavery parties though so it spent little time investigating how 
Buchanan and his supporters in the Democratic Party also “tried to exploit the gender 
beliefs of their constituents” in order to win the White House.14  Most examinations of 
the election paint the Democrats as only playing defense when it came to Buchanan and 
projections of ideal manhood.  Campaign materials suggest a more complex story. 
Supporters of the Democratic nominee, as well as Buchanan himself, actively promoted 
their own distinct masculine ideal just as much as the Republicans promoted theirs.  
 Lastly, Lorien Foote’s study of manhood during the Civil War, The Gentlemen 
and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army, shared Pierson’s 
conclusion that Northern and Southern states held competing gender ideals. Foote also 
claimed that there were competing ideals within just Northern states during the Civil 
War. Writing in 2010, she argued: 
 
The relatively coherent manhood ideal of southern men for the most part 
stemmed from the centrality of slavery to southern society and reflected 
the south’s more rural and traditional nature.  Northerners, who 
experienced transformative social and economic changes during the 
antebellum era, developed a variety of manly ideals that reflected both the 
social diversity of the region and the new class structures that 
accompanied modern life.15 
 
 
Using previously overlooked sources such as testimony during court martial proceedings 
within the army, Foote demonstrated that a robust debate existed among men throughout 
                                                 
14 Pierson, Hearts, 40. 
15 Lorien Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army. (New 
York: New York University, 2010), 14-15. 
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the Northern states about what constituted ideal manhood just a few years after the 
election of 1856.  The monograph’s focus on the North (similar to Pierson’s look at 
political parties that were antislavery) is particularly useful in relation to examining the 
election of 1856.  While it is easy to understand why the South supported the Democratic 
ticket due to the party’s support of slavery, it is less self-evident why enough Northern 
men backed the Democratic candidate to win him the election. 
 Foote also joined other gender scholars in admitting that, no matter the era under 
discussion, “all men cannot fit into the neat categories [that fellow historians] have 
devised.”16  She did however join historian Amy Greenberg in arguing that “amid the 
cacophony of options, two were preeminent and competed for dominance.” These terms 
are the restrained man, who valued self-control, and the martial man “who rejected the 
moral standards of restrained men and proved his manhood through physical 
domination.”17 
 This paper supports those conclusions: while in general masculine ideals divided 
along sectional lines, ideals of manhood at this time were more contested among 
Americans who lived in the North compared to the South.  The terms restrained 
manhood and martial manhood are somewhat reductive but still useful categories 
supported by primary scholarship.  This paper will utilize these terms and argue that an 
examination of the presidential contest of 1856 suggests that while Southerners generally 
favored martial manhood, in the North there was a split that mostly fell across party lines: 
Democrats in the North favored a “restrained manhood” while their Republican 
opponents in the North rallied around the ideal of “martial manhood.”  In the end though 
                                                 
16 Foote, Gentlemen, 16. 
17 Foote, Gentlemen, 16. 
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a majority of eligible voters both North and South preferred a restrained form of 
manhood in the White House, and this contributed to James Buchanan’s victory in the 
presidential election of 1856.   
 
 
 
 
The Election of 1856 
 
It has been over 160 years since the American presidential election of 1856, and 
yet in all that time not a single scholarly monograph has been written on the topic.  The 
absence of a stand-alone study is surprising.  All transfers of power are historic by 
definition, but the election of 1856 was especially so.  For one, it was the first 
presidential contest of the Third Party System (Democrats versus Republicans).18  The 
candidates themselves were also historic selections: the Democratic Party’s choice was 
former Secretary of State James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, the only lifelong bachelor to 
be elected president in American history. For their first-ever presidential nominee the 
Republican Party selected famous explorer and former Senator from California, John 
Fremont. In addition, former President Millard Fillmore made American history by 
running for president again after being out of office for a term.  He failed to garner much 
support as head of the American Party, a collection of National Whigs and the nativist, 
                                                 
18 Roy F. Nichols and Philip S. Klein, “Election of 1856: Emergence of the Republican Party” in The 
Coming to Power: Critical Presidential Elections in American History, Ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (New 
York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), 94. 
 11 
anti-Catholic followers of the Know-Nothing movement, but he arguably played spoiler 
in a handful of states.19  
The existence of scores of monographs devoted to the following presidential 
contest, the election of 1860, are justified by the fact that the result of that campaign led 
to secession and the official start of the American Civil War.  But the country did not 
jump into the Civil War overnight.  It was not harmony one day and Fort Sumter the next. 
There were already plenty of signs of national fracturing by 1856. 
  In 1852 the Whig Party, the Democratic Party’s main opposition since the days 
of Andrew Jackson, got clobbered at the polls due to an intraparty split over slavery.  The 
loss proved permanent.  Even though they had been one half of the stable two party 
system for multiple generations the Whigs never regained national political influence.20  
A number of political parties sprouted up to fill the vacuum, mostly at the state level at 
first.   As these various parties began picking up seats in Congress, especially after the 
midterm elections of 1854, the increased number of agendas under separate banners 
caused even more dysfunction within the legislative branch.  At the start of 1856 the 
House of Representatives struggled to complete even the most basic acts of governance 
as they entered the second month of “the longest and most contentious Speaker election 
in House history.”21  As it prepared for the upcoming presidential election, the American 
Party, originally thought to be stronger competition for the Democratic Party than the 
new Republican Party, proved unable to avoid the same fate as the Whigs and also split 
over slavery (Anti-slavery “North Americans” mostly collaborated with Republicans 
                                                 
19 Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 104.  
20 Elbert B. Smith. The Presidency of James Buchanan. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), 4. 
21History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, “The Longest and Most Contentious Speaker 
Election in House History,” https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-longest-and-
most-contentious-Speaker-election-in-its-history/. 
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during the election while the Southerners returned to the Democratic Party).22  Then 
President Franklin Pierce sought reelection but was denied his own party’s nomination. 
The country was so divided over the current occupant of the White House that the 
Democrats believed they had a better chance of holding on to the executive branch by 
ditching their current standard bearer and selecting a new man to run on an identical 
platform.  
Most alarmingly, acts of political violence were on the rise.  Just weeks before the 
national nominating conventions assembled in June of 1856, Democratic Congressman 
Preston Brooks of South Carolina used a cane to beat Republican Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts to the point of unconsciousness on the floor of the United 
States Senate. Brooks proudly boasted that the beating was in retaliation for a deliberately 
provocative and fiery speech Sumner gave attacking the institution of slavery and those 
who supported it.23  During the denunciation Sumner also mocked the speech impediment 
that Democratic Senator Andrew Butler had recently developed after suffering a stroke, 
and insinuated that the soldiers from South Carolina who fought in the Revolutionary 
War had been cowards. In addition to representing South Carolina, Congressman Brooks 
was also Andrew Butler’s cousin.24  
 The speech and then the caning received substantial attention in the partisan press 
throughout the election campaign, creating what one historian of the Brooks/Sumner 
affair termed “the first national media circus.”25  While notable for its location and the 
people involved, the caning did not lead to anyone’s death. The same cannot be said for 
                                                 
22 Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 104.  
23 Williamjames Hull Hoffer.  The Caning of Charles Sumner. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2010), 17. 
24 Hoffer, Caning, 16-30, 73. 
25 Hoffer, Caning, 9. 
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many of the violent acts that would take place across the Kansas Territory that year.  Due 
to passage of the contentious Kansas-Nebraska Act, the policy of “popular sovereignty,” 
or local control over matters of slavery, had become law. This led to chaos and horrific 
acts of violence as armed proslavery and armed antislavery camps flooded into the future 
state, eventually creating two distinct territorial governments fighting one another for 
legitimacy.26 By January of 1857 over two hundred Americans had been murdered by 
their fellow countrymen in Bleeding Kansas.27  War may not have been officially 
declared but the violence had already begun.   
The presidential election of 1856 happened amidst all of this national discord.   
While Buchanan replaced Pierce as President the Democratic Party still remained 
in control of the White House. This has no doubt contributed to the relative lack of 
scholarly interest in the election.  The majority of voters in 1856 chose the status quo 
while in 1860 they voted for change, and change elections typically generate more 
interest among historians. For the millions of men and women who participated in the 
campaign of 1856 though, who produced or read campaign literature, sang campaign 
songs at rallies, made passionate speeches at national conventions, and voted in state and 
national elections both for the winner and the opposition, the campaign and the election 
mattered in their own right, not just as a place holder for a more significant one to come 
later. 79% of the white men eligible to vote turned out on election day, the fourth highest 
percentage of the electorate to do so in American history. (This is almost as high as the 
consequential election of 1860 where 81% of eligible voters went to the polls.)28  When 
one views the campaign from the immediacy of the eyes of the participants rather than 
                                                 
26 Nichols and Klein, “Election of 1856,” 103. 
27 Hoffer, Caning, 67. 
28 Jean H. Baker, James Buchanan. (New York: Times Books, 2004), 179.   
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backwards from the critical change election of 1860, the election of 1856 proves itself to 
be a topic worthy of further examination by historians. 
 
 
Rumors of Same-Sex Sexual Behavior 
 
No examination of Buchanan and gender can escape the rumors regarding his 
sexual desires and behaviors.  Recent popular interest in Buchanan centers around 
speculation that he may have been America’s first “gay” president.  More specifically, his 
intimate relationship with William Rufus King has been the subject of much gossip on 
the internet.30  King was a prominent Southern Senator from Alabama who served as 
Franklin Pierce’s vice president for six weeks before dying of tuberculosis in 1853.  He 
was also a lifelong bachelor who lived with Buchanan for many years.  What is known 
about the relationship these two men shared? How was this relationship received at the 
time, before the construction of a homosexual identity? Was it ever weaponized against 
Buchanan in the political realm? 
A lot of unprovable conclusions have been drawn based upon the living 
arrangement of these two nineteenth-century public servants, similar to how rumors about 
Abraham Lincoln’s sexual behavior have centered around the fact that he shared a bed 
with multiple men.31  This was a common practice during the nineteenth century though, 
especially for young traveling lawyers like Lincoln or unmarried men such as Buchanan 
                                                 
30 A typical example can be read here: Timothy Cwiek, “James Buchanan: America’s First Gay President?” 
Washington Blade (October 4th, 2011).  http://www.washingtonblade.com/2011/10/04/james-buchanan-
america%E2%80%99s-first-gay-president/ 
31 See C.A. Tripp. The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005). 
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and King.32  That being said, while many men at the time, even married men, lived 
together in boarding houses while in Washington, most of these men tended to live with 
fellow members of their own state’s delegations. In fact, many representatives and 
senators from Buchanan’s home state of Pennsylvania lived together during the time 
Buchanan was in Washington, but Buchanan lived with King instead.  A senator from 
Pennsylvania and a senator from Alabama living together was far less typical, especially 
in the decade before the Civil War.  And doing so for fifteen years was less common 
still.33  
 So were King and Buchanan America’s first gay vice-president and president?  
Many amateur bloggers argue yes, definitely, but they are not the only ones.  Historian 
Dr. James Loewen, author of Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American 
History Textbook Got Wrong, went so far as to write in 2012 that “There can be no doubt 
that James Buchanan was gay, before, during, and after his four years in the White 
House.  Moreover, the nation knew it too--he was not far into the closet.”34  
The choice of words in that statement are problematic for historians of sexuality 
because “gay,” “the closet,” and even “homosexual” are anachronistic terms when 
discussing antebellum America.  As Murphy and others have shown, it was not until the 
latter decades of the nineteenth century that categories of identity based around one’s 
choice of sexual partners became commonplace. As Jean Baker, the only academic 
biographer of Buchanan to address the rumors surrounding his sexuality to date, 
explained, “Men in Buchanan’s time did not have sexual identities, although they did 
                                                 
32 Jean H. Baker, James Buchanan. (New York: Times Books, 2004), 110. 
33 Baker, Buchanan, 110. 
34 James Loewen, “Our First Real Gay President.” Salon (May 14th, 2012). 
https://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/our_real_first_gay_president/ 
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have sexual behaviors.”35  It is possible that Buchanan engaged in sexual behavior with 
other males but it strains credulity to argue that he would have identified as a distinct type 
of person because of that behavior. He could not label himself “gay” in 1856 anymore 
than he could label himself a “social justice warrior” or a “third-wave feminist.”  None of 
these terms existed during his lifetime.  
Did James Buchanan and William King engage in sexual behavior with each other 
then?  Dr. Loewen and others who think they did all cite some iteration of the same three 
meager pieces of evidence:  First, President Andrew Jackson once referred to Buchanan 
as “Aunt Nancy.”  Second, King had a reputation of being a bit of dandy and was once 
called “Aunt Fancy.” Third, a congressman described the two bachelors as “Buchanan 
and his wife.”36   
These three asides, while intriguing to many, do not provide enough evidence to 
draw any scholarly conclusions regarding these men’s sexual practices.  Taken together 
these comments do make it seem that these men were viewed as somehow defying 
gendered expectations, but this could be in reference to their status as bachelors, and/or to 
an unusually close platonic friendship between the two bureaucrats, rather than a sincere 
public admission that these men engaged in sexual behavior with one another.  
 Their surviving letters to each other also fail to provide any concrete evidence of a 
sexual relationship, although only a fraction of them remain.  In a move that does more to 
fuel twenty-first century speculations than anything else, the nieces of Buchanan and 
King, Harriet Lane and Catherine Ellis, burned the bulk of their uncles’ correspondence 
                                                 
35 Baker, Buchanan, 51.  Also see Robert Strauss. Worst. President. Ever.: James Buchanan, The POTUS 
Rating Game, and the Legacy of the Least of the Lesser Presidents.  (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2016), IX., and 
Murphy, Manhood, 36. 
36 Baker, Buchanan, 50. 
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to one another when Buchanan assumed the presidency.37  One of the most cited 
surviving letters by those advocating a sexual relationship is one Buchanan wrote to King 
in 1844, during their separation from one another while King served abroad as the 
Minister to France.  The current Senator from Pennsylvania wrote his absent roommate, 
“I am now solitary and alone, having no companion in the house with me.  I have gone a 
wooing to several gentlemen, but have not succeeded with any one of them.”38  The 
assumption of tone is key to understanding the meaning and intention of those words, and 
thus many people conclude whatever they would like.  While some see a frank admission 
of a desire for same-sex sexual companionship, others argue that Buchanan was being 
light hearted and humorous with a platonic friend.  As statements from the era go it was 
far less suggestive than the one from Abraham Lincoln’s grammar tutor (and bedmate), 
Billy Greene of New Salem, Illinois, who reportedly shared his view that Lincoln’s 
“thighs were as perfect as a human being could be.”39 It is not currently possible to 
conclude whether the relationship between these two men had a sexual component.   
Regardless, the relationship between Buchanan and King was relevant and 
deserves further study.  From America’s founding to the election of Abraham Lincoln 
political compromises related to slavery helped preserve the union.  The 3/5ths clause, 
the Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850 and many others became policy not 
because of impersonal institutions but because of the actions, views, and relationships of 
individual human beings.  Buchanan and King were part of the final generation of 
compromisers before the start of the Civil War. The political alliance between 
Doughfaces, like Buchanan, and Southern Unionists, like King, was key to the 
                                                 
37 Baker, Buchanan, 51-52. 
38 Quoted in Strauss, Worst, 89-90. 
39 See C.A. Tripp, The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).  
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preservation of the union and the success of the Democratic Party in the Antebellum Era, 
including during the election of 1856.  Understanding the warm personal relationship 
between two party leaders, one from the North and one from the South, can shine a light 
on our understanding of how the institution of slavery was accommodated in part due to 
the strength of specific relationships.  Historians have studied Mary Todd Lincoln’s skills 
as a hostess because of the effect they had in helping her husband achieve political goals, 
for example, and this is viewed as a valid and important subject of inquiry.40 
Understanding the effect William King’s southern roots had on the views and policies of 
President Buchanan and his administration is equally valid and important.  Historians will 
likely continue to disagree about the importance of confirming or disproving the sexual 
nature of their relationship, but historians should not dismiss this question of personal 
influence, regardless of the sex or gender of the historical actors involved. It is possible 
that the intimate relationship between King and Buchanan caused the latter to be more 
restrained in his political rhetoric or more eager to seek compromise with Southerners in 
general. More research on their relationship and its influence on antebellum politics is 
warranted.  
This is easier said than done however. Loewen’s second assertion, that the nation 
knew Buchanan and King had a sexual relationship, is worth consideration but also 
difficult to prove or disprove.  In his famous study of same-sex sexual behavior in late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century New York City, George Chauncey dismantled 
what he termed the myth of invisibility. In Gay New York, Chauncey convincingly argued 
that a subculture made up of multiple sexual identities and gender expressions not only 
                                                 
40 Pierson, Hearts, 186. Also see Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham 
Lincoln. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 590-593.  
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existed in New York City as early as the 1880s, but it was a world that was highly visible 
to outsiders as well.41  The parameters of Chauncey’s findings have been expanded 
beyond New York by studies such as Men Like That and Wide Open Town, to name just 
two examples.42  If Loewen was correct and there was public awareness of a sexual 
relationship between the two senators it would extend Chauncey’s findings on the myth 
of invisibility from the 1880s to the Antebellum Era and from New York City all the way 
to the White House. Again though, the historical record does not currently provide 
sufficient evidence to be able to make that claim with any certainty.  
Now, in times of political division and coarseness Americans often like to seek 
comfort in the past by imagining it as a more wholesome time than the present.  Because 
of this many may be led into a false sense of certainty that the personal lives of 
candidates, especially surrounding topics of family life and sexuality, would have been 
deemed off limits in the public sphere during the 1850s.  This argument is proposed by 
some who believe Buchanan’s sexual practices could have been common knowledge but 
that no one dared mention that behavior publicly due to social codes that have since 
fallen away.  The election of 1800, when Thomas Jefferson’s sexual relationship with 
Sally Hemmings was widely spoken and printed about, and the election of 1828, when 
the non-stop reporting surrounding Andrew Jackson’s wife Rachel’s previous marriage 
was so caustic that it contributed to her death, are just two examples which show that 
belief to be nothing more than wishful thinking.43  Even before the advent of the 
homosexual identity, personal and sexual relationships were weaponized in the political 
                                                 
41 Chauncey, New York, 2.  
42 John Howard. Men Like That: A Southern Queer History. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
Nan Alamilla Boyd. Wide-Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 1965. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003).  
43 Norma Basch. “Marriage, Morals, and Politics in the Election of 1828.” The Journal of American 
History. Vol. 8, No. 3 (1993): 890-918. 
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sphere. 1856 in particular was a year of intense political partisanship.  The official 
Republican Party platform of 1856 remains the only platform in American history that 
resolved to punish the opposition party if put into power.44  If Buchanan’s sexual 
behavior was an open secret as Loewen claims, it would be very unusual for his 
opponents not to have attempted to use that behavior against him as had been done in 
prior American presidential elections and would occur later during the Progressive Era, 
as Murphy detailed in Political Manhood.  
One claim that can be confidently made is that whatever was known about the two 
men and their relationship clearly did not limit their success in attaining impressive 
electoral and appointed offices. (Andrew Jackson may have called Buchanan Aunt 
Nancy, but he also felt comfortable naming him Minister to Russia.)  Nor did it cause 
people to be reticent in mentioning the friendship they shared in public, even when 
Buchanan was a presidential contender.  Based on the historical record, the Democratic 
press saw his relationship with William King as something voters would respond to 
positively.  During the campaign, a frequently reprinted article entitled “Buchanan at 
Home” painted a picture of the interior of Wheatland, Buchanan’s estate in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania.  While describing the estate, the author, Rushmore G. Horton, took time to 
note that he “was much gratified in finding in his library a likeness of the late Vice-
President King, whom he loved (and who did not?).  [Buchanan] declared that [King] was 
the purest public man that he ever knew, and that during his intimate acquaintance of 
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thirty years he had never known him to perform a selfish act.”45  Horton’s willingness to 
stretch the truth in order to praise Buchanan approached the point of absurdity: he 
described the candidate’s furniture as “non-ostentatious and democratic” for example. 
The author could have ignored the topic of the deceased King altogether.  Instead he went 
out of his way to highlight and express approval of the two men’s intimate acquaintance 
of over 30 years.  
The Buchanan/King relationship also received praise at the Democratic National 
Convention.  After John Breckinridge was selected as the party’s vice-presidential 
nominee his description of King as “the intimate and confidential friend of James 
Buchanan” was reportedly met with applause by the assembled delegates.46  No one ever 
weaponized his relationship with King, even those who never had anything nice to say 
about the future fifteenth president. 
Nor was it only Buchanan who was well respected in public by his companions.  
When King passed away, multiple former colleagues went out on the Senate floor and not 
only praised King’s decades of public service but also the example he set for the nation’s 
children.  Senator Lewis Cass took it even further saying, “In the whole range of 
American statesman there are few indeed to whom our youth can better look when 
seeking models of imitation and encouragement than to William R. King.”47  Similar 
references were repeated multiple times by senators from various regions of the country.  
Even when acknowledging the occasion of these remarks, they could have praised his 
public accomplishments without celebrating his life as a moral example for the nation’s 
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youth.  If Dr. Loewen is correct and it was common knowledge that Buchanan and King 
participated in a sexual relationship with one another, that would mean their fellow 
countrymen and women were much more tolerant of such behavior in the 1850s than has 
commonly been believed. Again, there is not conclusive evidence that that is the case. 
 Even taking all that into account however, historians cannot prove a negative.  It 
is possible that no one at the time suspected an improper sexual relationship between the 
two friends.  It is also possible that it was common knowledge that for some reason failed 
to make its way into the historical record in a conclusive manner. It could also be 
possible that the relationship was romantic but not sexual. 
While it is unlikely that Buchanan will ever be able to be called our first “gay” 
president with any degree of certainty, what Buchanan’s election can tell those interested 
in investigating an atypical White House is that Americans in 1856 were willing to elect a 
bachelor, who dearly loved his same-sex companion, to serve as the chief executive.   
Lacking a spouse, a status that was definitely public knowledge, clearly did not 
disqualify Buchanan from being a potentially effective president in the eyes of the voters: 
out of four million total votes he received a half million more than John Fremont, and a 
million more votes than former President Millard Fillmore, and both of those men were 
married.48  Further, primary sources covering the election demonstrate that concern over 
the future of slavery and fears of national disunion played a defining role in the selection 
of James Buchanan much more than concern about the marital unions of any of the 
candidates.49  When Buchanan’s bachelorhood was mentioned during the presidential 
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campaign it was never seen as disqualifying in and of itself, but was used to reinforce 
other pre-existing arguments both for and against a Buchanan presidency. 
 
 
Pro-Buchanan Arguments: The Statesman from Pennsylvania Will Bring Peace 
 
Supporters of Buchanan for president were not particularly effusive with their 
praise for the candidate himself.  The pro-Buchanan Pittsburg Morning Post described 
their state’s favorite son as “the most available and unobjectionable” option, echoing 
multiple editorials that praised the former Secretary of State as merely the “safest”, 
“soundest”, or “most prudent” choice.50  The Democratic partisan press assured their 
readers that the “Old Public Functionary,” as he was widely known, would make an 
“able” president.51  Campaign pamphlets barely disguised their lack of enthusiasm with 
sincere endorsements such as “Buchanan Will Make No Worse a President Than Franklin 
Pierce” and “Every Good Man Should Have His Turn.”52 Henry Wise, the Governor of 
Virginia and one of Buchanan’s most prominent surrogates during the campaign, said at a 
campaign rally that he was supporting the Democratic Party’s nominee for president 
“because it was due to the man.”53  After the Buchanan campaign achieved victory on 
November 4, 1856, the brother of an incoming cabinet official praised the president-elect 
as “the most suitable man for the times.”54  
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 If not popular enthusiasm then, what led to Buchanan’s electoral victory in 1856?   
 Much like Pierson’s argument regarding the influence of gender ideals on the 
outbreak of the Civil War, socially constructed gender ideology was not the sole reason 
the electorate chose Buchanan, but evidence suggests it was a contributing factor in the 
decision.  Voters in 1856 did not consider the policy differences between the parties one 
day and whether or not the candidates met their definition of ideal manhood on another 
day however.  As Katz and Bederman argued, manhood was being simultaneously 
evaluated from both the personal attributes of the candidates and the policy positions they 
held.  Therefore, an investigation into the period’s ideals of manhood will be included 
alongside more traditional political campaign analysis, more in line with the way the 
electorate experienced it.  
First, any contemplation of who would be the Democratic Party’s standard bearer 
had to include Buchanan simply because no one else at the time came close to matching 
his decades of experience on the national and international stage. One biographer has 
argued that, with the possible exception of James Madison, “no president had ever come 
to the office with more impressive credentials.  Nor, to this day, has any matched the 
range of Buchanan’s public positions.”55  It is undeniably true that the man who often 
ranks as the worst American President of all time was, at least on paper, one of the most 
qualified people ever to be nominated for the job.56  
A successful lawyer by trade, Buchanan’s public life started at 23 when he 
became the youngest member of the Pennsylvania State Assembly.  He entered national 
politics with a ten-year stint in the U.S. House of Representatives before being plucked 
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by Andrew Jackson to serve as the U.S. Minister to Russia.  Upon completion of that 
high-profile diplomatic position, Buchanan served in the United States Senate from 1834 
to 1845, where he wielded substantial influence as chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. In 1845 he joined President Polk’s cabinet as Secretary of State 
during a period that saw the annexation of Texas, war with Mexico, and a boundary 
dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon territory.  Buchanan was twice offered a seat 
on the United States Supreme Court from two different Presidents (he turned down both 
offers in order to pursue the presidency) as well as an offer to come out of “retirement” to 
serve as Minister to England during President Pierce’s tenure (which he did accept). In 
addition, he was a serious contender for the Democratic Party’s nomination in 1844 and 
1848, and in 1852 had led the voting on 34 ballots before, at the urging of Buchanan’s 
people, the deadlocked convention began throwing his support over to Pierce.57  
 Buchanan’s experience received frequent mention during the Democratic 
National Convention when the time came to select a candidate for President. Unlike 
conventions today where the nominee has often been unofficially selected months in 
advance, in 1856 the nominee was truly selected at the convention. Multiple speakers at 
the party’s nominating convention in Cincinnati mentioned Buchanan’s “most enlarged 
experience” and “preeminent qualifications” when attempting to persuade others to back 
the former Pennsylvania senator as their nominee.  Supporters frequently stressed 
Buchanan’s “many years of patriotic service.” John Breckenridge, the Democratic Party’s 
nominee for vice president, endorsed his running mate by referring to him as “the tried 
statesman of Pennsylvania.”58 
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At least equally important to Buchanan’s selection by the Democratic Party 
because he was a tried statesman of Pennsylvania was the fact that he was a tried 
statesman of Pennsylvania. Political operatives from both parties recognized 
Pennsylvania as the defining contest of the 1856 presidential election due to its twenty-
seven electoral votes.59 
The Republican opposition met shortly after James Buchanan secured his 
nomination at the Democratic National Convention, and they highlighted the importance 
of the Keystone State to the outcome of the election even more than the Democrats had.  
One of the clearest admissions of the importance of Pennsylvania in the election of 1856 
was the location the Republicans picked for their party’s first ever presidential 
nominating convention: Philadelphia.  While this was a fitting symbolic choice for the 
burgeoning party, laying the groundwork for a victory in Pennsylvania also made 
practical electoral sense.60 
 Although they had made exceptional gains in state offices in the two years since 
the party had formed, Republicans were in fact a sectional party at this time and knew 
they would earn few if any electoral votes from Southern states.  (This turned out to be an 
accurate assessment: forget about states, Fremont carried zero counties south of the 
Mason-Dixon line.)61   
This sectional party had many advantages in the presidential contest of 1856, 
however.  For one the population of the Northern states overwhelmed the Southern states 
by a ratio of 2:1. This gave the states in the North higher numbers of presidential electors 
on average than in the South.  At this time the state of Texas only contributed half the 
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electoral votes that the state of Maine did, for example.  The largest electoral prizes of the 
South were South Carolina and Georgia, with only ten votes a piece in the Electoral 
College.62  The Republicans were right to believe that if they could claim a few border 
states they could have won the election without carrying a single Southern state, or more 
likely, they would have thrown the election to the House of Representatives by keeping 
Buchanan from winning an electoral college majority.   
Buchanan himself now headed a party that, for all the Democratic claims of being 
the only remaining national party, was also becoming increasingly sectional. There were 
296 votes in the Electoral College at this time, meaning 149 electoral votes would win the 
presidency.  Both parties believed that about seventy of those votes were up for grabs, 
especially in states such as Pennsylvania (27 votes), Indiana (13), and Illinois (11).  New 
York, the largest electoral prize in the country (35), was deemed safely in Republican 
hands. 63  If Republicans won the second largest prize, Pennsylvania, and nine other votes 
from any swing state, they could have won the White House on their first attempt. By 
nominating native Pennsylvanian and favorite son James Buchanan as their nominee 
however, the Democrats purposely made the largest toss-up electoral prize in the country 
more likely to fall into their column.  
In addition to location, the Republican National Committee’s choice of timing for 
their convention also exposed their belief that Pennsylvania was going to be the site of a 
crucial and competitive campaign.  The national committee chose to hold their 
convention so it overlapped with the Republican Party’s Pennsylvania State Convention, 
also happening in Philadelphia, allowing the state and national campaign workers to 
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better coordinate their efforts.64  Having finished up their work at the state convention, 
the members walked over to the national convention and asked to be admitted.  When the 
chair of the national convention turned this request over to the delegates, a representative 
from the New Hampshire delegation replied that they were willing to give up their seats 
for the Pennsylvania delegates, or even “hold those who wish to be admitted in our laps 
rather than they should be excluded.”65   
Later, when the Know Nothing Party sent a message to the convention showing 
their support however, it sparked two days of debate on whether or not the notice should 
even be acknowledged.66  Clearly not everyone was automatically welcomed in; the 
inclusion of the state delegates was a strategic move. In fact, for some delegates hesitancy 
to acknowledge the Know Nothings came from a fear of alienating the large number of 
German-Americans living in states like Pennsylvania.  Towards the end of the convention 
they had just such a person, a German-born American citizen, address the crowd to push 
back against their fears about losing Pennsylvania due to the German vote.  This man 
reassured the crowd, saying, “I love Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania was the first to take me 
to her arms…I am sorry to hear any one even doubt of the certainty of Pennsylvania for 
freedom in the coming election.”67    
Further, Pennsylvania proved to be on the minds of the Republican delegates not 
just when discussing whom they wanted to include at their convention, but also when 
they were choosing who was going to oppose Buchanan in the general election.  Fremont 
was the likely favorite, but there were other contenders.  Salmon Chase had successfully 
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united a coalition of Republicans, former Whigs, and Know Nothings to win the 
governorship of Ohio and hoped to ride a similar fusion ticket to the White House.  He 
inspired little popular enthusiasm, however, and had few friends among the new party’s 
leadership.  William Seward of New York was likely the strongest anti-slavery politician 
at the convention, but he was deemed a risky choice for some delegates due to his 
previous disavowal of the Know Nothings.  Additionally, Seward’s friends advised he 
wait until 1860 when, they believed, the chance for a Republican win was more likely. 
Also in the mix was the moderate Judge John McLean of Ohio, the favorite of the 
Pennsylvania delegation.68 
 The centrality of Pennsylvania to the outcome of the election was addressed in 
multiple nominating speeches.  A New York delegate in favor of Seward urged everyone 
to compromise on a candidate who could win.  After praising Seward as “the best 
representative of our principles” he declared, “because we are told that he cannot carry 
Pennsylvania, we at once sacrifice him upon the body of the opposition (cheers).”69  
Upon realizing that McLean did not have substantial support at the convention compared 
to Fremont, his spokesperson, Judge Rufus Spaulding, read a letter written by McLean 
withdrawing his name from consideration.  Following this announcement, a delegate 
from Pennsylvania asked to address the crowd. He lamented that “the only name which 
could have saved Pennsylvania had been withdrawn” and although he would vote for 
whatever ticket the party settled on, he “feared that as a consequence they would lose 
Pennsylvania by 50,000 votes.”  According to the official proceeding printed by the 
Republican National Committee this was met with loud boos and groaning, indicating 
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that the crowd understood the stakes inherit in losing Pennsylvania’s electoral votes.70  A 
New York delegate took the stage and tried to give time for everyone to reassess now that 
the most likely candidate to please the Pennsylvanians had removed himself from 
consideration.  He proposed that “for the purpose of giving time for consultation—
especially with the Pennsylvanians—I move that the convention take a recess until five o’ 
clock this afternoon.”  The New York delegates’ proposal was approved.  The business of 
nominating a president was put on hold due to the importance of the Pennsylvania 
delegation. 
When the group reassembled at five that evening there was dramatic news: 
McLean had withdrawn his concession.  Apparently enough people had been scared by 
the threat of losing Pennsylvania’s electoral votes to reconsider his nomination.  Then the 
voting began.  Fremont carried the majority of the votes on the first ballot, earning 359 
votes to Mclean’s 190.  The nomination now seemed destined to be Fremont’s: the 
candidate with the next highest tally after Mclean was Charles Sumner with 2 votes, and 
that was mostly a symbolic show of support for the Senator who had been beaten with a 
cane on the Senate floor by Preston Brooks a few weeks earlier.  A new round of voting 
started in an attempt to give Fremont a unanimous vote of approval from the convention.  
Every state but two cast all of their votes for Fremont: Ohio and Pennsylvania.  McLean’s 
home state of Ohio gave him 14 of their 69 votes with the rest going to Fremont.  In a 
more concerning turn, Pennsylvania gave nearly a third of their votes to McLean.71  As a 
consolation, the convention catered to the wishes of the Pennsylvanians one more time by 
nominating McLean’s choice, young William Dayton of New Jersey, for Vice President. 
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As the Republican National Convention came to a close, both parties had 
demonstrated the centrality of Pennsylvania to the upcoming national contest.  
Buchanan’s status as a native son of Pennsylvania contributed significantly to his 
selection as the Democratic nominee. 
A third key factor in Buchanan winning the election of 1856 was his absence 
during the recent controversies surrounding the extension of slavery in the United States.  
As Minister to England Buchanan served abroad from 1853 to 1856, conveniently absent 
when the passage of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act divided the nation.  This act called 
for local control over the status of slavery, allowing for the possible extension of slavery 
not just in the new territory out west but also in places north of the Mason Dixon line 
where the peculiar institution had previously been banned by law. The Republican Party 
made opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act a central tenet of their party, and by doing 
so achieved impressive electoral wins during the midterm elections of 1854, winning 
elections in all but four states and causing Democrats to lose control of the House of 
Representatives.72  Due to his administration’s support of the divisive legislation, worried 
Democrats refused to re-nominate President Franklin Pierce for a second term, fearing he 
was too unpopular to win reelection.  Buchanan’s other main competition for the 
nomination, Illinois’ Stephen Douglas, had written and introduced the bill into the 
Senate, and thus was also too tied up in the recent controversies to gain the support of 
two-thirds of the delegates at the Democratic National Convention either, particularly due 
to holdouts from the North.73  
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In fact, when the Pittsburg Morning Post praised Buchanan for being 
“unobjectionable” they argued he was unobjectionable specifically because he had not 
been around for “many of the recent disturbing issues.”74 The Pittsfield Sun supported his 
nomination as well because he was “not mixed up with the modern strifes.”75  A 
campaign pamphlet celebrated that Buchanan’s service abroad “presented the advantage 
of being more recently out of the fierce conflicts which the Democracy has waged against 
a dangerous and powerful faction.”76 All Buchanan’s major biographers agree that not 
having been at the center of the previous years’ political fights played a decisive role in 
his selection as the party’s standard bearer.77 
Buchanan’s personality and temperament were also commented on by many as a 
reason he was the right man for the times.  In a campaign speech on June 13th Virginia 
Governor Henry Wise argued that “to settle this sectional strife, no man could bring so 
much Northern strength to unite with the South in defense of the Constitution and the 
Union as James Buchanan has brought and can bring.”  Buchanan would unite the 
country and settle the sectional strife that was already a national reality in 1856.  Part of 
this was due to his policy positions.  Since Buchanan supported popular sovereignty just 
as his predecessor Franklin Pierce did, Wise predicted that if Buchanan won the election 
“then we may regard the doctrine and the practice as settled and sanctioned, and the 
South may feel safe, and the North be content to abide by the Constitution as it is.”  But 
Wise continued, saying that Buchanan himself “had healing in his wings…to compose 
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these strifes.”78  Buchanan would “settle sectional strife” by uniting Americans through 
policy positions, but also because of the type of man that he was.  
Buchanan’s personal temperament, as described by Wise and others, fits the 
definition of Amy Greenberg’s “restrained manhood,” particularly as it relates to restraint 
and self-control.  Greenberg described a “restrained man” as someone who exhibited 
“self-restraint and moral self-discipline” in contrast to someone who glorified “physical, 
often bloody cultural expressions.”79 In other words, a “restrained man” was someone 
who had the self-control to resist getting into a fight.  
In his campaign speech, Wise called Buchanan “civil in every sense,” and as a 
“civilian and statesman of experience,” Wise noted approvingly that Buchanan had 
always been both “prudent” and “cautious.” Wise returned to this theme later in the 
speech when he argued that Buchanan’s “soft, winning, gentle, forbearing” nature 
enforced his belief that “he is the man to turn away wrath.” Another prominent Democrat 
who supported Buchanan for president, Senator Thomas Hart Benton, similarly described 
Buchanan as “never a leading man in any high sense, but eminently a man of peace.”80  
Over and over again Democrats in the north praised Buchanan in similar language 
to that used by Wise and Benton.  The Erie Observer argued Buchanan would make a 
great choice because he was a “wise and cautious statesman.”81  A lengthy pro-Buchanan 
campaign pamphlet distributed in the North spent a lot of space depicting their nominee 
as fitting the ideal of a self-restrained man.   After describing the democratic nominee’s 
childhood in Pennsylvania, the author explicitly noted, “Here in the humble home 
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[Buchanan] first learned the lessons of self-control.”  Later Buchanan received praise for 
his “mild and impressive manners” and his “great tact and sagacity.”  The future 
president himself was quoted extensively during the campaign advocating for a restrained 
type of manhood for the country: “Would to Heaven that the spirit of mutual forbearance 
and brotherly love, which presided at [America’s] birth, could once more be restored to 
bless the land!”82 Lastly, the pamphlet went even further by celebrating the fact that 
Buchanan had endured a lifetime in politics without “souring a disposition which is 
feminine in its delicacy, its gentle courtesy, its patient kindliness” before arguing that 
“James Buchanan is the man for the times.”  Being delicate, courteous, and kind to the 
point of seeming feminine was something that Buchanan backers expressed as necessary 
for the next male leader of the nation. 
Calls for restraint were being made in reaction to the rise in political violence.  
Benton voiced the fears of many Americans in 1856 when he said, “We are treading upon 
a volcano that is liable at any moment to burst forth and overwhelm the nation.”83  Within 
a climate of growing tension, where even prominent senior politicians were voicing fears 
that events might quickly erupt and create an unprecedented national crisis, a man with a 
personality who could “turn away wrath” was seen as desirable in a President. Even if not 
viewed as a “leading man”, Buchanan’s supporters championed a “soft and forebearing” 
type of man who would not fight, but thanks to his restrained temperament, bring peace 
to a divided nation.  
When viewed from this context, the newspaper endorsements that called him the 
“safest”, “soundest”, and “most prudent” choice for president now seem meant to be 
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higher praise than might be initially assumed. Just as Pierson demonstrated that Fremont 
and his supporters “tried to exploit the gender beliefs of their constituents” in order to 
win the White House, Buchanan and his supporters were engaged in the same activity, 
just with a different image of the ideal man. And, as Pierson also argued in Free Hearts 
and Free Homes, while this depiction of Buchanan as an ideal example of restrained, 
even feminine, manhood was not the sole cause of the election’s outcome, primary 
research indicates that it was one of the contributing factors at play.   
Now, while enough voters believed Buchanan was the right man for the times to 
hand him the presidency, there were also millions of Americans who hoped someone else 
would win the election. 
 
Anti-Buchanan Arguments: A Spectrum of Martial Manhood 
  
While Buchanan’s distance from the political controversies that occurred in the 
years preceding the election of 1856 made him an attractive candidate to Northern 
Democrats, that distance caused southern delegates at the Democratic National 
Convention to prefer other men to lead their party.  Further, these preferences and the 
language they used to contrast Buchanan and his Democratic rivals reveals competing 
definitions of manhood between Northern and Southern delegates within the same party.  
The hope that Buchanan could be a unifying figure helped him gain the most 
votes on the first ballot, thirteen more than the sitting president and over one hundred 
more than Senator Stephen Douglas.84  When it became clear after subsequent balloting 
that Pierce would not be able to win the requisite support the majority of Pierce’s 
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supporters switched over to Douglas.  It took seventeen ballots for Buchanan to clinch the 
nomination, mostly due to Pierce and Douglas holdouts from states in the deep South.85  
Buchanan’s reputation as a friend to Southern interests and defender of the institution of 
slavery was well established.  It is understandable that in the climate of the 1856 election 
some in the South might not trust a northern candidate’s loyalty to their interests 
regardless of their record, but these same people had no problem backing New 
Hampshire’s Pierce and Illinois’ Douglas.  So why did Southern delegates prefer Pierce 
and Douglas if there was essentially no difference in where the candidates stood on the 
issues?  
 The answer appears to be the reverse of why so many Northern delegates thought 
he was the right choice: because Pierce and Douglas had been at the forefront of the 
political fights of the last few years.  Southern delegates saw them as fighters, and that is 
what they wanted.  Once Douglas withdrew and it became clear that Buchanan was going 
to win the nomination, each state that had backed other candidates switched their vote 
over to Buchanan so he would receive unanimous support from the convention.  A 
delegate from North Carolina explained his delegation’s previous votes against Buchanan 
in language that would be echoed by many other state delegations.  He explained that 
their support for Pierce was in appreciation for the “bold and manly stand taken by his 
administration in…upholding the rights of all the states in this union.”86 They then had 
switched over to Douglas out of “high appreciation of the eminent services rendered to 
his country” by the “gallant leader” of the Kansas and Nebraska Bill.”87 While they now 
fully supported James Buchanan as the nominee they had voted differently earlier 
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because “pending his stay in Europe events transpired which identified Messrs. Pierce 
and Douglas more prominently than others with certain leading issues before the country, 
and we respect their services in that…”88 
 What catches one’s eye when searching the record for historic ideals of manhood 
is the way the three men are consistently described in similar language in all of these 
explanatory statements.  Georgia also praised Douglas for how he “manfully battled for 
great constitutional and conservative principles” but when they turned their focus to the 
nominee all they could muster was to reassure those present that they had “a warm and 
cordial Southern heart for James Buchanan.”89 
Missouri explained how Douglas had “endeared himself to the state of Missouri 
and the whole country in manfully standing up for all the great principles of the 
Constitution…and the moral heroism with which he has constantly met and vanquished 
the enemies of our peace, and the enemies of our Union, but since he has directed his 
friends to withdraw his name…” they would now support “a statesman of the greatest 
talents and ability.”  They continued by cheering Buchanan’s “ability and sagacity as a 
diplomatist.”90 
State after state drew a contrast between the two contenders for the nomination 
who had participated in “manly battle” and the skills or “abilities” of a great “statesman.”  
According to the words chosen to describe the candidates there was a nearly unanimous 
consensus among the Southern delegates of the Democratic National Convention that 
there was a difference between being “manly” like Pierce and Douglas, a designation that 
appears to be aligned with taking action and defeating enemies, and being a restrained 
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statesman like Buchanan who could adequately preside over the nation’s affairs as a 
peaceful Chief Magistrate. The language used repeatedly connected the ideal of manhood 
to people who embraced conflict. Men were not afraid to stand up and fight others. 
Rather than being restrained like a statesman and seek civil compromise, men “do battle” 
for what they believe in.  
Southern Democrats preferred men like Douglas and Pierce who were closer to 
their ideal of a combative, or martial, masculinity. In reality all three of the top 
contenders for the Democratic nomination were Northern statesmen who better fit Amy 
Greenberg’s definition of restrained manhood—none of them committed acts of physical 
domination against their political opponents.  Categories of gender are never absolute 
however, and although they did not literally commit acts of violence they were still 
viewed as fighters.  Rather than view masculine ideals as distinct, rigid categories, a 
spectrum may be more useful here.  On one end were reserved diplomats like Buchanan, 
peaceful and full of tact, but missing in action.  Fiery and combative politicians like 
Douglas and Pierce were still reserved but exhibited more martial manhood than 
Buchanan by dominating others politically and winning contentious legislative battles. 
Men like Preston Brooks, a man who famously committed an actual act of physical 
domination, more strongly exemplified the ideal of martial manhood.  While Brooks did 
not compete with Buchanan for the nomination, his centrality to a national debate about 
ideal manhood during the heat of the campaign makes him an illuminating subject of 
inquiry when considering views on gender in the election of 1856. 
Much has been written about the Brooks/Sumner caning, but there has been little 
focus on how this affair impacted the 1856 presidential election specifically.  Most 
secondary literature either explores one topic or the other, as if they had little to do with 
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one another.  One biographer does note it occurred close to the nomination of Buchanan 
but does not elaborate.91   
Evidence suggests that the caning inflamed passions across the nation though, and 
more specifically it served as a focal point for Republicans at campaign rallies throughout 
the general election. 
Republican rallies were known for their boisterousness.  According to historian 
Philip Klein, Republicans at this time were much younger on average than members of 
the Democratic Party, and mostly made up of individuals seeking to overthrow the status 
quo. He described Republicans as “young reformers and dedicated crusaders, a group 
which was, in contrast to others…committed, enthusiastic, passionate, optimistic, 
uncompromising, and imbued with a sense of religious mission.”92 Perhaps it is 
unsurprising then that Republican rallies were loud and emotional events, with lots of 
marching, singing, and public processions.  Republican campaign songs sought to excite 
passion among the young people turning out at the rallies.93  The inclusion of Brooks in 
multiple Republican campaign songs is evidence that Brooks and his actions stirred 
passions across the country during the election of 1856, while simultaneously providing 
further evidence of how ideals of manhood differed across the country.  Many anti-
Buchanan songs have verses that also reference Brooks with lyrics such as “And with 
them we’ll beat old Buchan!/ Yes, rout the whole gang, from Douglas to Brooks/Who’d 
subdue us with canes…” or this one sung to the tune of Auld Lange Syne: “The South 
may send her champions out/Her cowards armed with canes/The freemen of the North 
fear not/Her tyrants or her chains.”94   
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Beyond these references however there were also multiple songs exclusively 
devoted to the topic of Preston Brooks.  One song that went to the tune of a popular 
campaign song from a previous presidential campaign (“Tippecanoe and Tyler Too”) 
asked “Have you heard of P.S. Brooks, Brooks, Brooks/With his gutta percha cane?/For 
he struck a blow, laid our champion low/But it roused the nation for once and again/And 
it’ll take a mighty big cane, cane cane/Slavery’s cause to gain.”  Another song labeled 
him “Bully Brooks” and condemned how “He thoroughly had learned the knack/Of 
welting Sambo’s tawny back…/ But tiring of this pleasant game/And bent on varying the 
same/He form’d a safe and easy plan/To flog a harmless Free-State man…”95  These 
songs were not sung in South Carolina, the only state Preston Brooks was on the ballot.96  
They were sung in the North during political rallies for the presidential campaign.  
Besides Fremont and Buchanan no other man had as many campaign songs devoted 
entirely to them, including the candidate for the American Party, former President 
Millard Fillmore. The inclusion of Brooks and this incident of physical domination in so 
many of these songs supports the conclusion that the caning was an influential element of 
the 1856 presidential contest.  
In his monograph on the cane attack, historian William Hoffer detailed how 
responses to the affair were not just seen at campaign rallies, but they dominated the 
partisan press as well.  He termed it “the first national media circus” and noted that the 
coverage remained constant from the day after the attack on May 22, 1856, all the way 
through the election in November.97  Responses, Hoffer found, were sharply divided by 
region.  Through his research of newspapers in 1856 he found that “editorials in the 
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North and border states agreed that the attack was ‘brutal,’ inappropriate in its location, 
and improper.  Northern language was more condemnatory of Brooks as a ‘brute’ and 
exculpatory of Sumner’s use of language in the ‘Crime against Kansas” speech.  
Democratic commentaries tended to focus more on what Sumner had done to provoke 
it.”98   
An examination of newspapers does indeed show that trend.  One Northern 
newspaper editorialized that “the spirit of ruffianism exhibited by Brooks cannot be too 
highly censured” while another mocked Brooks, claiming that “brute force was resorted 
to, to accomplish by the blows of a club what they could not do by the power of 
intellect.”99 The use of physical dominance made Brooks a ruffian, comparable to the 
unmannered men pouring into Kansas and causing unlawful violence, men commonly 
referred to at the time as “border ruffians.”100  According to commentators in the North 
Brooks was not an ideal man because of his successful dominance of another person. In 
fact, resorting to violence made him something less than a man; it made him a brute. 
  Brooks’ manhood was challenged by a Boston paper one day after the attack: 
“The member from South Carolina transgressed every rule of honor which should 
animate or restrain one gentleman in his connections with another in his ruffian assault 
upon Mr. Sumner.  There is no chivalry in a brute.  There is no manliness in a 
scoundrel.”101 A man’s honor was tied to how restrained he could be. Failing to restrain 
himself from committing an act of violence made him less than a man, it made him a 
brute. 
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In contrast, Southern Democrats, much as they honored Pierce and Douglas for 
their willingness to fight rhetorically and legislatively for policy positions, also praised 
Brooks for his willingness to resort to a physical method of control. After it was reported 
that Brooks had broken his cane during the assault, Southern supporters sent dozens of 
canes to the Congressman, some with inscriptions such as “Hit him again” and “knock-
down arguments.”102  Editorials maintained that it was Sumner in fact who failed to meet 
a masculine ideal by, in a widely reprinted phrase, “bellowing like a calf” after he had 
been struck down.103  Not only could he not adequately defend himself in a fight, these 
Southerners argued, but also he was as pathetic as a weak animal being slaughtered once 
the blows had been struck.  Similar to the use of the word “brute” to imply that Brooks 
was somehow less than a full man, the frequent comparisons of Sumner to a calf sought 
to depict him as failing to meet the requirements of ideal manhood. Some papers went 
further and mocked the perceived delicate sensitivities of Northern Republican men in 
general, as well as accusing Sumner of faking the extent of his injuries for sympathy.  A 
paper out of Richmond, Virginia was perhaps the bluntest when it wrote, “Fanatics of the 
male gender, and weak-minded woman and silly children, are horribly affected at the 
thought of blood oozing out from a pin scratch.  And Sumner is wily politician enough to 
take advantage of this little fact.”104  Men who could get upset over the sight of blood 
were categorized with the women and children, and this time associations with femininity 
were not was viewed as admirable.  According to what was written in Southern 
newspapers, a real man was a fighter who was not afraid of spilt blood.   
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The solid support Brooks had throughout the South supports Foote’s conclusion 
that “martial manhood” was an ideal broadly held throughout the South at this time.  But 
what about the doughfaces, the Southern-sympathizing Northern Democrats from states 
like Pennsylvania who proved crucial to Buchanan’s victory in 1856?  How did they react 
to this caning? 
 Consistent with the ideals they held up in praise of Buchanan, Northern 
Democrats mostly called for restraint in the aftermath of the caning.  They did not praise 
Brooks for his attack but they also thought Sumner had been indelicate in his speech and 
thus provoked Brooks.  Their argument was neither man had conducted himself well.  
The New York Tribune reported that Buchanan himself viewed the incident this way.  
After a Northern man from Illinois, W.W. Sterling, gave a speech condemning “the 
attack of Canine Brooks upon the noble Sumner for defending freedom,” he found 
himself sitting next to the current Democratic nominee.  The reporter for the Tribune 
claimed he overheard Buchanan disagreeing with Sterling’s framing of the caning. While 
he agreed that “Mr. Brooks was indelicate” he lectured Sterling, saying, “My young 
friend, you only look upon the dark side of the picture.  Mr. Sumner’s speech was the 
most vulgar tirade of abuse ever delivered in a deliberative body.”105  The statesman did 
not care for the violence, but he also felt the need to condemn the lack of tact exhibited 
by the senator from Massachusetts.  While the validity of this source relies on the honesty 
of the reporter, no one from the Buchanan camp ever disavowed this statement.  Doing so 
would have been politically unwise since the majority of Northern Democrats appeared to 
agree with this assessment.  Also, both sides being to blame helped make the argument 
that a peaceful candidate like Buchanan was the right man for the times. Both Brooks and 
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Sumner were unable to show the restraint necessary to keep their passions from leading 
to violent conflict.  Unlike Buchanan, these men lacked the ability to turn away wrath.  
While most Southern Democrats viewed Brooks an ideal man, for Northern Democrats 
the caning affair highlighted the need for a man of peace like Buchanan to preside over 
the country. 
Intriguingly, while Republican newspapers focused on how “unmanly” Brook’s 
actions were, there was an electrifying moment at the Republican National Convention 
that depicted respect for the ideal of “martial manhood.”  In a moment not mentioned in 
the secondary literature, one speech demonstrated that celebrations of violence were not 
strictly limited to those who lived in the South.  At the Republican National Convention, 
a speaker elicited some of the most intense cheering of the entire proceedings when 
giving a passionate response to reported threats made by Southern congressmen against 
their Northern colleagues should they vote to expel Brooks from the House of 
Representatives for his caning of Sumner.  While lengthy, the excerpt below deserves to 
be quoted in full due to how forcefully it contradicts the notion that martial manhood was 
strictly a southern ideal: 
I see by telegraphic dispatches from Washington that the announcement is 
made when that question comes up in the House the Southern gentlemen 
are to make threats and perhaps to execute them.  [Shouts of let them 
dare.]  Gentlemen, I believe that the men who represent you have made up 
their minds.  [Vociferous cheers/cries of Good! Bravo!]  I believe they 
have made up their minds to go where duty requires them to go, vote as 
duty requires them to vote; and I believe they have made up their minds to 
defend their persons and their lives whenever [tremendous and long 
cheering] whenever, wherever, however, by whomsoever assailed [great 
cheering]. No gentlemen, threats will not silence the freemen of the North.  
We know we have behind us fifteen millions of freemen [cheers]—we 
know that if we fail in the exercise of our constitutional duties, and in 
defense of our constitutional rights, that gallant and true men all over the 
North will step into our places, and fill them better than we can do. [loud 
cheers]  Gentlemen, trouble yourselves with no anxiety about affairs in 
Washington.  We will take care of ourselves [thundering cheers] We want 
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to have it known all over the land that the representatives of the Northern 
freemen are ready to take care of themselves in the performance of their 
duty [cheers].  But while we make that resolution and adhere to it, in 
God’s name, gentlemen of the North, resolve to do your duty and to blot 
out the Slave Power of the country [cheers].106 
 
 
 
No calls for preservation of the union or restraint were uttered in this well received 
speech, but instead a call was made at a national convention made up of Northern 
delegates, not just to defeat their opponents politically, but to “blot the slave power out of 
the country” entirely.  Unlike the restrained Buchanan, who would fail to do his duty and 
stand up to the slave power, these Northern freemen were not going to be controlled by 
threats, but instead were going to speak their mind, vote, and even fight if necessary. 
 A promotion of “martial manhood” also occurred during the nomination of 
potential Republican candidates for vice-president, but the tone was more humorous.  
While the eventual pick would be William Dayton, there was substantial interest in a 
former congressman named Abraham Lincoln.  The delegate from Lincoln’s adopted 
state of Illinois praised the future president’s physical vigor by describing him as being in 
“the prime of his life—about fifty-five years of age—and enjoying remarkably good 
health.”  While he was actually 47 at the time of the convention, he was in good health, a 
legitimate issue when considering whom to pick as a vice-president.  It shifted 
unquestionably into the territory of “martial manhood” when Judge Spaulding called out 
to the speaker, “Can he fight?”  Lincoln’s nominator shouted back, “Yes! Have I not told 
you he was born in Kentucky? [Applause.] He’s strong mentally, he’s strong physically, 
he’s strong in every way.”107 
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These celebrations of “martial manhood” at the Republican National Convention 
fit in with Foote’s research into ideals of manhood within the Union Army during the 
official Civil War.  A key aspect of the Republican speaker’s willingness to commit 
violence is that it would be done “to defend their persons and their lives.”108  In her 
monograph Foote disproves what she calls a “common misconception among scholars 
who study manhood in the nineteenth century,” namely historians who tend to 
“emphasize the contrast between self-controlled northern manhood and passionate 
southern manhood.”109  She found that Northern men justified passionate outbursts of 
physical dominance if the person was defending himself or if an aggressor interfered with 
their ability to perform their official duties.  This overlooked moment at the Republican 
National Convention, along with campaign songs that condemn “Bully Brooks” for his 
act of physical dominance while simultaneously promising to “rout the whole gang” in 
return, shows that some support for “martial manhood” was present in the Northern states 
at least half a decade before the war as well.  While conceptions of manhood were 
broadly sectional, closer scrutiny reveals that there were some shared ideals between 
North and South.  Northern Democrats on the whole still favored restraint, and their 
candidate won the election of 1856.  With “martial manhood” being cheered on by both 
Republicans and the majority of Democrats, however, perhaps it was already too late to 
contain the violence for long, even with a peacemaker as president. 
 
 
Anti-Buchanan Arguments II: A Lack of Manly Independence 
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While Buchanan’s failure to adequately perform “martial manhood” actually 
helped him win the Democratic nomination, it also made him less attractive as a 
presidential contender to many Americans, particularly in the South, who wanted a 
fighter in the White House.  This was not the only way Buchanan was seen as not 
achieving ideal manhood however. During the campaign the future president was 
consistently attacked by Republicans in the North through convention speeches, 
campaign songs, and political cartoons for lacking what can be termed manly 
independence. 
The first Republican National Convention met in Philadelphia in June of 1856, 
eleven days after the Democratic party nominated Buchanan and less than a month after 
the caning of Charles Sumner.  The first mention of Buchanan at the convention 
contrasted his private character and his policy positions.  The President of the RNC, 
Robert Emmet of New York, had been a lifelong Democrat who recently joined the 
Republican Party in response to passage of the Kansas/Nebraska Act.  Emmet admitted to 
the assembled crowd that “I have known honorable James Buchanan for forty years and 
upwards, intimately” even going so far as to say that “some of the dearest and most 
cherished recollections of my life are connected with my associations with him.”110  The 
speaker maintained that he “would defend [Buchanan’s] personal character if assailed” 
and was only motivated by objections to “his political character—if I were not in deadly 
hostility to that, I would not be here.”111   
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Objections to Buchanan’s personal character were expressed at the Republican 
National Convention however.  Additionally, the policy positions that the convention 
President objected to were used to define and then condemn the type of man Buchanan 
supposedly was.  When examined together these statements reveal a pattern that is 
helpful in further understanding ideals of manhood in the lead-up to the Civil War. 
 Emmet continued speaking. At first, he did in fact keep his comments focused on 
policy: Buchanan had been a staunch advocate for the Missouri Compromise as late as 
1848, but by 1850 abandoned that stance in support of the Compromise of 1850 which 
rendered the previous compromise null and void.  However, the condemnation of 
Buchanan’s policy change soon took on a personal character.  Emmet accused “the 
honorable James Buchanan of having shown a want of firmness, a want of self-reliance, a 
want of adhesion of principle, and an over-zealous devotion to party in several aspects of 
his life.”112  Much like the Southern delegates at the Democratic National Convention, 
the speaker did not see Buchanan as someone willing to do battle for core principles.  
Instead of being firm in his beliefs, he was soft.  Instead of being guided by principle he 
was over-zealous, or over-emotional, in devotion to his party.   
 Buchanan opened himself up to this attack with one of the only public statements 
he issued during the entire campaign.  Following the protocol of the time, delegates from 
the convention traveled to their nominee’s home in Lancaster, Pennsylvania to formally 
announce that he had been selected as their candidate for President.  In response 
Buchanan released a public statement where he fully endorsed the platform that came out 
of the convention in Cincinnati.  He went even further by saying “I have been placed 
upon a platform of which I most heartily approve, and that can speak for me.  Being the 
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representative of the great Democratic Party, and not simply James Buchanan, I must 
square my own conduct according to the platform of that party, and insert no new plank, 
nor take one from it.”113  This was likely a statement meant to reassure his tepid Southern 
supporters in the Democratic Party. It proved to be a winning strategy for at least some of 
these men.  Preston Brooks admitted, "Mr. Buchanan was neither my first nor second 
choice for the Presidency,” but because he unequivocally endorsed the Cincinnati 
platform without reservation, Brooks supported him, explaining that he “could not be 
unfaithful to the man without treachery to the principles he represents.”114 
 This stance did not escape condemnation however.  While no Republican at the 
convention mentioned Buchanan’s bachelor status, his lack of independence was the 
chief attack made against him by numerous state delegations.  One speaker personally 
denigrated the Democratic nominee for: 
acknowledging that he is no longer James Buchanan, a free agent, with the 
right of expressing whatever will or opinion he may have of his own; but 
that he is bound to that platform, and to every plank of it, and that he has 
no right or power to remove or alter one plank of it—an admission that he 
has allowed himself to be chained to the Juggernaut of Slavery, and he 
allows himself to be dragged headlong by it. [Loud Cheers.]  I make all 
allowance, fellow citizens, for the impossibility of a man in this country, 
who is a politician, who is a party man, of his having his own will, and 
carrying it out in all respects.  It is, I allow, impossible.”115  
 
By portraying a party man as someone who by definition lacked the independence 
necessary to achieve ideal manhood, this speaker turned the “statesman” label meant as a 
compliment by Buchanan’s Democratic Party colleagues into an insult.  The implicit 
statement is that Fremont’s lack of political experience, which could be viewed as a 
                                                 
113 Greeley, Buchanan, 14. 
114 Greeley, Buchanan, 15. 
115 Greeley, Republican National Convention, 18, 31. 
 50 
liability in a presidential contest, actually made him an independent man unencumbered 
by any interests, particularly the interests of party and of slaveholders. 
 Attacks on Buchanan’s independence continued throughout the convention.  A 
third delegate denigrated Buchanan for “being willing to humiliate himself in the dust 
before the cart of slavery, and to consent to be made the instrument of perpetuating and 
extending its rule.”116  The metaphor of an animal pulling a cart implied that Buchanan is 
no man but a beast of burden being used in service of the slave power.  The Republican 
delegates from Pennsylvania knocked his lack of manly independence while again 
arguing he was only chosen as the nominee because of electoral math.  “But the slave 
power wanted a tool,” the Pennsylvania delegate said, “it wanted the vote of a northern 
state, and it cast its eye to Pennsylvania and James Buchanan.”117  Again, Buchanan is 
less than a man, nothing but a mere instrument or tool.  The Democratic Party’s 
nominee’s manhood was called into question because his positions revealed him to be too 
dependent and submissive to others. 
 Nor was it only at the conventions that this argument against Buchanan was made.  
Numerous Republican campaign songs also derided the lack of manhood they saw 
evident in Buchanan’s refusal to stand up to the slave power.  One song argued that when 
Buchanan had “grown old his party thought/they’d take Uncle James by the nose/And put 
him up in a fight they fought/With slavery’s host of foes.”118  The Democratic Party was 
leading Buchanan, not the other way around, according to this song.  Another song 
referred to Buchanan as “slavery’s hack” who had “no spine in his back.”  Shortly before 
election day, yet another song announced that, “We cannot vote for Buchanan/In a few 
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days, in a few days/Because he is not a freeman.”  By saying Buchanan was not a 
freeman, the lyricist of this song, and everyone who sang it, was saying that Buchanan 
was equal to a slave, and therefore not an ideal man.  One Republican campaign song 
made the connection they saw between doing the bidding of the slave power and 
becoming a slave oneself even more explicitly: “For freedom is dear—Southerners can’t 
rule here/For we’re not their niggers, that’s very clear/For we’re not their niggers, that’s 
very clear!/For they can’t govern us, that’s so, so, so!/For they shan’t govern us, that’s 
so!”119  The song implied that if one lacked mastery over oneself, if one was governed by 
Southerners, meaning the slave power, one lacked a defining characteristic of a freeman.  
At this time ideal manhood was something only white men could claim; in fact manhood 
was defined by the exclusion of those who could not claim independence over 
themselves: women, children, and slaves.120   Whereas Murphy argued that during the 
Progressive Era the homosexual other was used as a foil to help define manhood through 
excluding those who were deemed unmanly, in the Antebellum Era the unmanly and 
dependent other was a slave.121 This was true in the North as much as the South. The 
above song demonstrates a fear that the Southern slave power is trying to take away 
Northern white men’s independence. They allowed themselves to be governed by 
Southern interests they would be reduced to the status of slaves, a change that they resist 
throughout the song. According to them Buchanan lacked the manly independence 
necessary to protect not just his own, but their manhood as well. 
Anti-Buchanan political cartoons published during the campaign are a third primary 
source available to historians that showed Northerners criticizing Buchanan’s lack of 
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mastery over himself and insinuated that that lack of self-mastery made him less of a 
man.  One of the less subtle ones showed Buchanan lying down horizontally and serving 
as a literal platform:122  
 
 
The nominee is propped up by prominent Doughfaces like Pierce and Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton, and via a speech bubble is saying, “I am no longer James Buchanan 
but the platform of my party.”  A slave and his owner are sitting on top of platform-
Buchanan, literally being supported by him. The slave owner is holding a whip in one 
hand and a gun in the other, and his speech bubble says, “I don’t care anything about the 
supporters of the platform as long as their platform supports me and my nigger.”123 The 
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argument of the image was that the slave owner was the one with the power, the 
Doughfaces on their hands and knees were the base of his support, and Buchanan, servile 
to the wishes of both those under him and above him, was practically irrelevant.  If he 
were removed from the image the slave owner and his slave would just be sitting on the 
other Democrats.  In this image he was portrayed as literally not a man, just a plank to 
support those who control him.  More frequently than any other attack against his 
manhood, Buchanan’s lack of independence was discussed seriously in conventions, and 
mocked through numerous campaign songs and editorial cartoons.  This argument 
implied that Buchanan’s manhood could be determined via his party devotion, just as it 
was thought that the type of man he was could reveal the policies he would pursue as 
President of the United States. 
 
 
The Role of Buchanan’s Bachelorhood 
 
While his lack of mastery over himself was the chief complaint made against 
Buchanan during the election, his bachelor status did receive some attention during the 
campaign as well.   
Interestingly, there is only one recorded instance of the speakers at either national 
convention mentioning Buchanan’s bachelorhood.  As already mentioned, no statement 
was made about it at the Republican National Convention, when delegates already knew 
that their nominee would be running against Buchanan.  The only speaker who addressed 
the subject at the Democratic National Convention did so in the speech immediately 
following Buchanan’s official clinching of the nomination.  Colonel Samuel Black of 
Pennsylvania, coming to the close of a speech praising his party’s nominee, said, “Mr. 
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Buchanan, we confess, is a bachelor.  But the reason is a complete vindication as will, I 
am sure, satisfy every gentleman here present.  It is this—as soon as James Buchanan 
was old enough to marry, he became wedded to the Constitution of his country, and the 
laws of Pennsylvania do not allow a man to have more than one wife.”124  While meant as 
a humorous remark Black also demonstrated political savvy.  Calling one an adherent to 
the Constitution, especially in front of the Southern-dominated Democratic Party, was a 
loaded choice of words akin to describing someone as being for “state’s rights” during 
the Civil Rights Era one hundred years later.  Colonel Black’s statement essentially said, 
“Do not worry about the particulars of the man; he is for our policies.”  This was another 
way of saying what Buchanan himself said to the electorate: do not worry about who I am 
as a person, I am for the Democratic Party’s platform.  For Democrats like Preston 
Brooks in the South, and to crucial Northern democrats in states like Pennsylvania, this 
proved to be a winning argument.  The need to “vindicate” Buchanan’s bachelorhood 
with a satisfactory reason suggests an awareness that his single status was a defiance of 
norms that could potentially make their candidate vulnerable, but not to the extent that 
the topic could not be joked about.  Perhaps doing so was a conscious attempt to 
minimize the damage the issue could bring to the campaign by framing it as a trivial.  
Based on the election results it appears the majority of the electorate agreed with that 
assessment. 
 In contrast with the conventions however, both Buchanan’s and Fremont’s marital 
status received attention in campaign biographies, in Republican campaign songs, and in 
the partisan press.  The Fremont campaign publicly celebrated their candidate’s marriage 
with Jesse Fremont, daughter of one of the most famous Democratic senators of the age, 
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Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri.  Decades earlier Fremont and 17-year-old Jesse Benton 
had caused a national scandal when they eloped against the wishes of her powerful father.  
Benton eventually gave in to his daughter’s refusal to part with Fremont, allowed the 
young couple to live in his house, and used his connections to secure employment for the 
Pathfinder, as he was known, getting him a job surveying land out west.  In 1856 this 
family squabble became front-page news again when Thomas Hart Benton endorsed and 
campaigned for Buchanan over his own son-in-law.125  In Free Hearts and Free Homes 
Pierson argued that the elopement with Jessie “enabled Republicans to fashion John into 
a model of idealized masculinity.”126  Unlike Colonel Black talking about Buchanan’s 
marital status, Fremont’s supporters did not feel the need to make jokes about his 
elopement.  Rather than an embarrassing scandal from Fremont’s past that should be 
avoided, Republican speakers like Kansas Governor Charles Robinson argued that, “the 
man who dared to take the responsibility of captivating and running away with Jessie 
Benton in defiance of [her father]—such a man will not hesitate to take the responsibility 
to wipe out the policy and corruptions of Frank Pierce from the White House.”127  In 
other words, Fremont’s marriage, and specifically the manly qualities he demonstrated by 
eloping with Jessie, would have positive policy implications.  Unlike Buchanan, a tool of 
the slave power, Congressman Burlingame of Massachusetts claimed that John and 
Jessie’s elopement demonstrated that the Republican candidate “was a man who could 
not be driven, who could not be scared.”128  The argument to voters was that just as he 
had stood up to Senator Benton, Fremont was manly and independent enough to stand up 
                                                 
125 Candice Shy Hooper, Lincoln’s General’s Wives: Four Women Who Influenced the Civil War-for Better 
and for Worse. (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2016), 41. 
126 Pierson, Hearts, 138. 
127 Pierson, Hearts, 139-140. 
128 New York Daily Tribune, September 25, 1856. 
 56 
to the slave power and those Doughface Northerners and Southern politicians who, in 
their view, supported the slave power under the guise of preserving the national union 
between the states.  It is likely the effectiveness of the argument was enhanced by those 
inclined to believe it by the fact that Senator Benton himself was one of those politicians.  
Fremont would not be a tool like Buchanan; he would continue to be a freeman of action 
who was brave enough to take what he wanted.  Supporters of Fremont argued that his 
demonstration of manly action and independence served as a window into the kind of 
policies he would implement as President of the United States. 
Members of Congress were not the only ones who felt they could extrapolate 
what kind of men the candidates were based on their marital statuses.  While the majority 
of German and Irish immigrants continued to give their support to the Democratic Party 
in 1856, at least some found the difference in marital status worthy of consideration when 
casting their vote.  At a meeting of Germans in New York City, a speaker voiced the 
question, “Shall we vote for an old bachelor, who had never the courage to take a wife?  
Or shall we vote for…the man who had the courage to steal his wife when she was 
refused to him?”129  Ignoring how Jessie Fremont’s independence was not considered in 
this statement, the distinction drawn between an old bachelor and the courageous man 
who took physical action to get what he wanted could not be more stark. There is an 
implied judgment that being a bachelor was a lesser status that did not live up to the 
speaker’s ideal of manhood. 
 These are clear cases of James Buchanan’s bachelorhood being used against him 
in the political arena.  None of these men ever said though that being a bachelor alone 
should disqualify Buchanan from serving as President.  The bachelor status supposedly 
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revealed something about the character of the man, something that is seen time and time 
again throughout the campaign.  In contrast to Fremont, Buchanan had failed to 
demonstrate that he was his own man, someone who would drive the nation, not be 
driven by others.  His lack of a wife was a symptom of a larger problem: Buchanan’s lack 
of independence and his willingness to submit to others.  Fremont’s supporters used his 
marriage to Jessie to drive the narrative that he was bold, courageous, and manly.  The 
New York Herald wrote a pro-Fremont editorial that contrasted the two candidates thusly: 
“Through his whole life [Buchanan] has been a cold and timid man, following in the 
wake of other men, while Fremont has been a veritable and notable pioneer, leading the 
way in the path of empire, and opening up hitherto unknown regions to science and 
Anglo-Saxon civilization.”130 This was already an established narrative: one candidate 
was a follower while the other was a leader.  One was a tool, a Doughface willing to 
submit to Southern wishes, while the other was “the Pathfinder,” a man who blazed his 
own trail.  Marital status fit into that narrative, and received significant attention during 
the election, but in speeches and partisan newspapers it was merely a piece of larger 
narratives about the candidates based around policy issues and ideals of manhood.  
 In contrast, Republican campaign songs frequently mentioned Buchanan’s 
bachelorhood.  Most references were only a line or two, such as “they say of true 
manhood, he hasn’t a drop/Who has not the courage the question to pop.”131  Similar to 
the convention speeches and newspaper editorials, these lyrics were a humorous way to 
connect his bachelor status to larger narratives of the campaign that were already 
established, that Buchanan lacked the courage necessary to meet ideals of manhood. 
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Often bachelorhood was only brought up at the end of songs that focused on other aspects 
of the election.  For example, one song that was mainly devoted to extolling the virtues of 
Fremont only references Buchanan’s lack of a spouse in the final verse: “Then hurrah for 
Fremont, and Jessie too/And with them we’ll beat the bach’lor man!/We should, we will, 
we can--/And with them we’ll beat old Buchan!”132  Fremont is great enough to deserve 
your vote all on his own, the song argued, but with a Republican win the voter will also 
get Jessie too, whereas “the bach’lor man” only comes by himself.  Similarly, another 
song saw his bachelorhood as an additional way to put down Buchanan in contrast to 
Fremont.  After attacking Buchanan for various reasons, chief among them being the oft-
repeated criticism that he was a “tool” of the plantation owners, the song ended by 
criticizing that Buchanan had “no dearer self/The partner of his soul/Fremont has got a 
“better half”/And what must be the whole!/And in the old White House shall send/Sweet 
music to the aisles/And like a Jessiemine will wreath/Its perch with flowering smiles.”133  
But both of these songs treat the marital status of the two major candidates as one issue 
among many, and certainly not the issues that are at the top of the list of complaints.   
Additionally, these songs seem to be capitalizing on pro-Jessie Fremont sentiment 
at least as much as negative feelings related to bachelorhood.  Songs that reference that 
Fremont was married tend to mention Jessie by name, either directly or, as in the case of 
the last song, indirectly by making a play on the name of the Jessamine flower.  Jessie 
Fremont biographers like Candice Shy Hooper have argued that Jessie was wildly 
popular among the Republican electorate.  Hooper, reflecting on the many ways that the 
election of 1856 was a historic campaign, added that it was also “the first presidential 
                                                 
132 New York Herald, July 14th, 1856. 
133 New York Herald, July 14th, 1856. 
 59 
election in which a candidate’s wife was prominently featured in a positive manner.”134  
Banners at rallies often celebrated both “John and Jessie” and one went even further by 
excluding John Fremont all together: “Jessie for the White House.”  Hooper argued that 
“the nascent Republican Party seized upon Jessie’s popularity and her talents to attract 
attention to it.” 135  Certainly her inclusion in so many Republican campaign songs 
supports that conclusion.  It is likely that some of this criticism of Buchanan’s 
bachelorhood was simply a way for Republicans to continue keeping the politically 
popular Jessie Benton-Fremont in the mind of voters as much as possible.  Rallies were 
designed to excite larger swaths of the electorate compared to the conventions, which, 
especially in the nineteenth century, focused more on party platforms and policy 
distinctions.  Therefore it makes sense that the rallies gave more attention to the 
candidate’s popular wife, and also referenced Buchanan’s lack of a wife more frequently, 
than either party felt compelled to do at their national conventions. 
Finally, there is an oft-cited political cartoon that mocked Buchanan’s 
bachelorhood while simultaneously making the more consistent criticism that the 
candidate lacked manly independence and changed his policy positions whenever 
advantageous.136  
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The image is of Buchanan sitting alone in a dark room looking sad and trying to 
mend an old coat above the caption “Reverie of a Bachelor”, an allusion to the title of a 
popular non-fiction book of the same name published in 1850.  All of this subtly 
highlighted that Buchanan lacked a wife, like Jessie Fremont perhaps, who could mend 
his clothing for him.  The illustrator may have wanted viewers to pity Buchanan, but 
certainly he was not a man to admire or vote for.  This cartoon is one of the most cited by 
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historians when discussing the election of 1856 or just Buchanan in general, especially 
when claiming his known gay identity.137  The focus is almost always solely on the jabs 
taken at Buchanan’s single status.  Writers like Loewen argue that Buchanan sewing, a 
gendered action associated with femininity, was evidence that people during his time 
knew that he was involved in a homosexual relationship.  Once a person understands the 
political issues of the period however, a closer look at the cartoon reveals that while it did 
indeed poke fun at Buchanan’s bachelorhood the main attack of the cartoon was about his 
flip-flopping on slavery’s expansion.  In the cartoon, while working alone in the dark 
room Buchanan mutters to himself, “My old coat was a very fashionable Federal coat 
when it was new, but by patching and turning I have made it quite a Democratic 
garment.”  To the politically aware in 1856, or those who studied the political history of 
the 1850s, this would be an obvious jab at Buchanan’s shifting party allegiances, a clever 
way of referencing that this Democrat used to be a part of the Federalist Party.  The 
cartoon version of Buchanan goes on to remark, “That Cuba patch to be sure is rather 
unsightly but it suits Southern fashions at this season.”  The coat does indeed have a 
newly (and somewhat clumsily) sewn on patch that says “CUBA” in large letters.  This 
references Buchanan’s expansionist desire to annex Cuba as a territory of the United 
States, a desire shared by most southern Democrats and loathed by Republicans because 
both believed that Cuba’s climate and geography would likely lead to the expansion of 
slavery.138  The critique here is again twofold. Buchanan the bachelor cannot sew well, 
but the cartoon more seriously criticized him for taking policy positions based on the 
“fashions of the season” and supporting what he knew to be “unsightly” in order to win 
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Southern favor.  Finally, Buchanan’s speech bubble ends by mentioning his bachelorhood 
explicitly.  Cartoon Buchanan says, “If I am elected, let me see, $25,000 per annum, and 
no rent to pay, and no women and babies about, I guess I can afford a new outfit.”  The 
sad old lonely man in the image, whom the illustrator wanted the audience to understand 
had no spouse or children that he cared for like Fremont, could very well get a new coat 
if he was elected to the White House.  The jab at the bachelorhood, the personal attack, is 
undeniable, but it is not about homosexuality.  Like all good political cartoons there is a 
more complex statement beneath the jab though.  The political argument was about his 
lack of adhesion to principle, that just as he once transformed his Federalist coat into a 
Democratic one, no one can be sure what kind of coat, or what policy positions, 
Buchanan would actually stick to if he was elected President of the United States.  As has 
been seen, this argument was made against Buchanan everywhere during the campaign of 
1856: not just in this political cartoon, but in the partisan press, in campaign songs at 
rallies, and even at the conventions that failed to make an issue of his bachelorhood.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Buchanan’s bachelorhood was repeatedly commented upon during the American 
presidential campaign of 1856, but the election results prove that it was a status that 
voters were willing to look past. While campaign songs and political cartoons mocked 
Buchanan for not having a spouse, being unmarried was not discussed as disqualifying in 
and of itself, even by Buchanan’s political opponents. To them, his bachelorhood was 
rather a symptom of Buchanan’s larger defects as a leader. To Southerners Buchanan was 
not enough of a fighter; to many Northerners he lacked manly independence. Both groups 
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preferred other men as leaders, men who more closely performed their ideal of “martial 
manhood.” Once Buchanan became the nominee and promised to uphold the Democratic 
Party’s platform, Southerners backed him with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The 
Southern states alone would not have won him the election however.  Buchanan’s 
electoral victory depended on support from Northern Democrats. For those voters, 
Buchanan’s “restrained manhood” was appealing since these moderate voters hoped for a 
man who could keep the peace. In 1856 a martial type of manhood was defeated at the 
polls and a restrained type of manhood was elevated to the White House. 
However, while restrained manhood triumphed politically in 1856, calls for a 
more “martial manhood” at the Republican National Convention illuminate the existence 
of an appreciation of that ideal in the North as well as the South. And in the next election, 
the election of 1860, the country chose Abraham Lincoln, a man the Republican Party 
portrayed as a rough frontiersman just as they had with Fremont only four years earlier. 
Once Johnson finished Lincoln’s term there were seven men who served as president 
before Theodore Roosevelt assumed the office. Six of those seven had fought in the Civil 
War. It appears a restrained type of manhood fell out of favor even before the rise of 
Roosevelt and the simultaneous construction of the homosexual identity. Was this 
perhaps due to feelings caused by the failures of the Buchanan administration? Or the 
expansion of the commander-in-chief aspect of the presidency under Lincoln? More 
broadly, are there patterns to when America has sought a restrained man in the White 
House versus someone who appears more combative? What can these patterns tell us 
about a given time’s process of creating manhood?  Further study is needed. 
It is possible that no amount of further study will ever tell us whether James 
Buchanan and William King had a sexual relationship. Even if that could be proved it 
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would still be inaccurate to call James Buchanan our first “gay” president, since that 
category of identity did not exist during his lifetime. James Buchanan was still a unique 
figure in American history however, and not just for being the only lifelong bachelor to 
be elected president. He was also a man who was elected President of the United States 
due in part to the fact that his personality was determined to be more feminine in nature 
than his opponent’s. He was elected because of, and not despite, these perceptions. Many 
who like to speculate that Buchanan was “gay” are interested in him because they are 
seeking leaders from the past who challenged dominant gender ideals. While Buchanan’s 
feminine masculinity was actually idealized by many in 1856, a Progressive Era man 
deemed to be feminine could find his political career in ruins, as detailed in Murphy’s 
study. It is often erroneously assumed however that that is the way that it always was. 
Therefore, those wishing to challenge historical assumptions regarding gender ideals can 
still use the example of Buchanan: his election in 1856 is evidence that the interplay 
between gender ideals and presidential politics has been more complex and varied than is 
often understood. 
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